Decentring and distraction reduce overgeneral autobiographical memory in depression by Watkins, E.R et al.
Psychological Medicine, 2000, 30, 911–920. Printed in the United Kingdom
" 2000 Cambridge University Press
Decentring and distraction reduce overgeneral
autobiographical memory in depression
E. WATKINS," J. D. TEASDALE and R. M. WILLIAMS
From the Institute of Psychiatry, London; and MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge
ABSTRACT
Background. Increased recall of categorical autobiographical memories is a phenomenon unique to
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and is associated with a poor prognosis for
depression. Although the elevated recall of categorical memories does not change on remission from
depression, recent findings suggest that overgeneral memory may be reduced by cognitive
interventions and maintained by rumination. This study tested whether cognitive manipulations
could influence the recall of categorical memories in dysphoric participants.
Methods. Forty-eight dysphoric and depressed participants were randomly allocated to rumination
or distraction conditions. Before and after the manipulation, participants completed the
Autobiographical Memory Test, a standard measure of overgeneral memory. Participants were
then randomized to either a ‘decentring’ question (Socratic questions designed to facilitate viewing
moods within a wider perspective) or a control question condition, before completing the
Autobiographical Memory Test again.
Results. Distraction produced significantly greater decreases in the proportion of memories
retrieved that were categorical than rumination. Decentring questions produced significantly
greater decreases in the proportion of memories retrieved that were categorical than control
questions, with this effect independent of the prior manipulation.
Conclusions. Elevated categorical memory in depression is more modifiable than has been
previously assumed; it may reflect the dynamic maintenance of a cognitive style that can be
interrupted by brief cognitive interventions.
INTRODUCTION
A body of evidence has accumulated (reviewed
in Williams, 1996) suggesting that depressed
people find it difficult to recall specific auto-
biographical memories. When asked to recall
specific autobiographical memories to positive
and negative cue words, parasuicidal patients
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams &
Dritschel, 1988) and depressed patients
(Williams & Scott, 1988; Kuyken & Brewin,
1995; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995) retrieve signifi-
cantly fewer specific memories and more over-
general memories than non-depressed controls.
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Overgeneral memories were defined by Williams
& Dritschel (1992) as either being categorical (a
summary of repeated memories, e.g. waiting at
bus stops, making mistakes) or extended (taking
place over a period longer than one day, e.g. on
holiday in France). Further research has de-
termined that depressed participants differ from
control group participants in their tendency to
produce more categorical memories but not
extended memories (Williams & Dritschel, 1992;
Goddard et al. 1996).
Importantly, increased recall of overgeneral
autobiographical memories is a process that
appears unique to depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder (McNally et al. 1994, 1995).
Elevated recall of overgeneral memories has not
been found in anxious subjects (Richards &
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Whittaker, 1990), generalized anxiety dis-
order patients (Bruke & Mathews, 1992) or
social phobic patients (Rapee et al. 1994).
Furthermore, research suggests that overgeneral
memory retrieval in depression maybe of some
clinical relevance. In a longitudinal study of de-
pressed patients, Brittlebank et al. (1993) found
that high levels of overgeneral memory were
associated with poor prognosis for depression.
Furthermore, patients who have difficulty in
recalling specific memories are impaired at
interpersonal problem solving (Evans et al. 1992;
Goddard et al. 1996; Sidley et al. 1997).
Considering the association between over-
general memory retrieval and both prognosis
and problem solving in depression, demon-
strating that a particular intervention could
reduce overgeneral memory in depression would
be of some consequence. Previous studies have
suggested that overgeneral memory is a relatively
stable process, not influenced by changes in
mood or by pharmacological intervention.
Williams & Dritschel (1988) found no significant
difference in recall of specific memories between
suicidal and recovered patients in a cross-
sectional study, although both groups recalled
significantly fewer specific memories than never-
depressed controls. Brittlebank et al. (1993)
found no significant change in overgeneral
memory to positive and negative cues upon
remission from depression (prinicipally after
pharmacological treatment) in a longitudinal
study.
However, the impact of cognitive inter-
ventions on overgeneral memory in depression
was not tested in these studies. It is possible that
psychological therapies that focus on discussing
specific events may be more likely to reduce
overgeneral memory recall than antidepressant
medication. Williams et al. (2000) reported that
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy signifi-
cantly reduced the recall of categorical memories
in remitted depressed patients, compared to a
treatment as usual condition. Mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy is a relapse prevention treat-
ment, teaching meditative approaches as well as
standard cognitive therapy skills. This finding
suggests that cognitive interventions may
influence overgeneral memory retrieval.
In a pilot study (Watkins, 1999) designed to
investigate the effect of a decentring induction
(Watkins et al. 2000) on the hedonic tone of
recalled autobiographical memories, there was a
reduction in the overgenerality of memories
recalled by dysphoric participants. The
decentring induction consisted of Socratic
questions like those used in cognitive therapy to
challenge negative thoughts. In particular, we
designed questions to increase awareness of the
transience of moods (e.g. ‘How long does any
mood last? ’). We hypothesized that the
decentring questions would increase awareness
of the transience of mood states in order to
challenge attributions that characterize
depressed mood as permanent and characteristic
of the self. Since these attributions have been
implicated in the maintenance and exacerbation
of depression (Abramson et al. 1978; Teasdale
& Barnard, 1993) reducing them should hasten
recovery from a sad mood. Consistent with
these hypotheses, Watkins et al. (2000) found
that a significantly greater proportion of
participants in a decentring group than a control
group demonstrated recovery from an induced
negative mood and reported shifts in perspective
concerning mood states.
The observed reduction in overgeneral mem-
ory following decentring prompts (Watkins,
1999), further suggested that cognitive inter-
ventions might manipulate the retrieval of
overgeneral memories. Watkins’ (1999) finding
was serendipitous and did not use the standard
overgeneral memory paradigm (Autobiographi-
cal Memory Test (AMT), Brittlebank et al.
1993; Williams, 1995). Furthermore, the design
of the study involved participants ruminating
for 8 min (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993)
before random allocation to decentring
questions or control questions, in order to
maximize any existing negative thoughts and
feelings. Rumination involves focusing attention
on the self, current symptoms of the depressed
mood and on the causes, consequences and
meaning of the current mood. It is possible that
the reduction in overgeneral memory was the
result of an interaction between rumination and
decentring}control questions rather than a main
effect of decentring v. control questions.
The present study was a more systematic test
of whether experimental cognitive manipu-
lations could influence overgeneral memory. As
well as attempting to replicate the effect of the
decentring manipulation on overgeneral mem-
ory, the distraction and rumination tasks devised
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by Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow (1993) were
used. Distraction involves focusing attention on
mental images unrelated to mood or self. The
distraction task was a control task for ru-
mination; we did not use a no-activity control
task since the dysphoric sample was likely to
have a high natural level of rumination. The use
of both distraction and rumination tasks prior
to decentring and control prompts allowed a test
of whether the decentring effect on overgeneral
memory would only occur when preceded by the
rumination task.
A direct comparison of the effects of ru-
mination v. distraction on overgeneral memory
would also be interesting since Williams (1996,
p. 261) proposed that the over-elaboration of
categorical memories is ‘encouraged by and
itself encouraging ruminative self-focus’.
Williams hypothesized that ruminative self-focus
may reduce working memory capacity and
therefore limit the resources available to shift
processing away from the default mode of
categorical memory retrieval. Consistent with
this hypothesis, Singer & Moffitt (1992) found
that when undergraduates were asked to recall a
specific memory that ‘helps you understand
yourself as an individual ’, more overgeneral
memories were recalled, compared to students
given standard recall instructions. Focusing on
the self and trying to understand the self are two
aspects of Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) concept of
rumination. This finding suggests that rumi-
nation may increase overgeneral memory recall
in non-depressed subjects.
Previous studies of overgeneral memory have
focused on the proportion of the memories
recalled that were general (Williams &
Broadbent, 1986; Brittlebank et al. 1993) or
specific (Williams & Scott, 1988). We used the
proportion of memories recalled that were
categorical as the principal measure of over-
general memory because overgeneral memory in
depression depends on categoric memories
rather than extended memories (Williams &
Dritschel, 1992; Goddard et al. 1996).
In summary, the present study investigated
the hypothesis that overgeneralmemory retrieval
in depression is an aspect of information
processing that is influenced by the cognitive
state of the person retrieving the memory, rather
than an unmodifiable style. Our first prediction
was that, replicating the findings of Watkins
(1999), decentring prompts would produce a
significant reduction in overgeneral retrieval,
relative to control prompts and that this effect
would be independent of the preceding ma-
nipulation, whether distraction or rumination.
Watkins (1999) found no effect of the decentring
prompts on dysphoric mood in people with
spontaneously occurring dysphoria ; therefore,
we expected the decentring intervention to have
no effect on mood. Our third prediction, based
on previous studies by Nolen-Hoeksema and
colleagues was that the rumination task would
maintain or increase dysphoric mood while the
distraction task would reduce dysphoric mood.
Our fourth prediction was that distraction would
reduce overgeneral retrieval, relative to rumi-
nation.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight volunteers (16 males, 32 females,
average agefl 39–5 years, s.d.fl 12–1 years) were
recruited by press advertisements asking for
volunteers who experienced frequent sad moods.
All met the criteria of age 18–65 and a Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al. 1961)
score " 14 at testing. Of the volunteers, 54%
met criteria for current major depressive dis-
order, 75% met criteria for past major depressive
disorder and 17% met criteria for dysthymia on
the Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnosis
(SCID; Spitzer et al. 1990), using DSM-III-R
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) cri-
teria. The mean BDI score of the participants
studied was 24–4 (s.d.fl 8–1).
Materials
Self-report measures
Participants rated their mood on two 0–100
scales ranging from 0 (I do not feel at all X) to
100 (I feel extremely X), where X was ‘happy’
and ‘despondent’ respectively (Teasdale et al.
1980).
Distraction and rumination
The distraction and rumination tasks were
adapted from the tasks used by Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow (1993), with items
adjusted for British participants. In the ru-
mination condition, participants focused their
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Table 1. Details of decentring and control prompts
Decentring prompts Control prompts
What different views do I have of myself? What different photos do I have myself?
How long does this feeling last? How long does this weather last?
What will I think about this in ten years time? What will I buy with this ten pounds?
How long does any mood last? How long does any weather last ?
How does this one moment fit into my whole life? How does this one sofa fit into my whole house?
Have all my past feelings changed with time? Have all my skills improved with practise?
Don’t I have both good and bad times? Don’t businesses have both good and bad times?
How important will this moment appear from my deathbed? How good will this view look from my window?
What fraction of me is how I feel now? What fraction of my life do I spend asleep?
attention on items that were symptom-focused,
emotion-focused and self-focused, e.g. ‘Think
about what your feelings might mean’ and
‘Think about the possible consequences of the
way you feel ’. In the distraction condition,
participants focused their attention on items
that were externally focused, e.g. ‘Think about
the shape of a large black umbrella ’ and ‘Think
about a raindrop sliding down a pane of glass ’.
In each condition, participants concentrated on
45 items for a total of 8 min.
Decentring v. control prompt task
Participants randomly received either the
decentring or control versions of the task. The
active component of the decentring induction
was nine Socratic questions reminding partici-
pants of the transience of mood states, each of
which was scrambled with one word added, as
used by Watkins et al. (2000). For each sentence
the added word was a synonym for a word in the
original sentence, e.g. ‘How long does any mood
last? ’ was converted to ‘mood long does any
stay last how?’ (added word in italics). The
control version replaced the nine decentring
prompts with nine scrambled control prompts,
e.g. ‘Have all my skills improved with practise? ’
was converted to ‘all my skills improved with
practise have increased? ’. Nine extra neutral
statements were scrambled, e.g. ‘Paris is the
capital of France’ was converted to ‘Paris capital
centre of is the France’, and interspersed among
both the scrambled decentring or control
prompts. These neutral statements were filler
statements designed to make the theme of the
decentring questions less obvious. Participants
unscrambled the sets of words into meaningful
sentences, which they wrote down and read
aloud. We used the scrambled sentence task to
ensure that participants processed the meaning
of the questions, (i.e. during the unscrambling)
without any explicit instructions to alter their
perspective towards mood states. The task was
not time limited and participants did not
explicitly answer the questions during the task.
Thus, the task tested the effectiveness of Socratic
questions to influence mood and cognition,
while minimizing demand characteristics. Pre-
vious demonstrations that the decentring
questions altered recovery from induced de-
pressed mood (Watkins et al. 2000) and
influenced memory recall (Watkins, 1999),
suggest an implicit effect of the prompts on
cognition and emotion. Table 1 contains the
complete list of (unscrambled) decentring and
control prompts.
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT )
This task was the test described by Williams
(1995). Participants were given 30 s to recall a
specific personal memory to each of six positive
words (e.g. happy), six negative words (e.g.
failure) and six neutral words (e.g. bread). A
memory was coded on the specificity of the
subject’s first memory response; as specific if it
occurred at a particular place and time and
lasted less time than a day, as categorical if it
was a summary of repeated events and as
extended if it lasted longer than a day. If there
was no memory response in 30 s, we coded this
as an omission. Three parallel forms, matched
for emotionality and frequency of words were
counterbalanced within each group for time of
measurement. The prompt ‘Can you think of a
particular time?’ was used for ambiguous
responses. The instructions and cue words were
administered by tape recorder. Comparison of
the experimenter’s categorizations with two
blind raters showed that specific and categorical
memories could be reliably distinguished (inter-
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rater agreement on a random sample of 8% of
memories (Nfl 210) was, respectively, 93–8%
and 86–4%, jfl 0–86 and jfl 0–72 (Cohen, 1968)
controlling for agreement due to chance).
Design
Participants were randomly allocated to four
groups; a rumination-then-control group;
rumination-then-decentring group; distraction-
then-control group; distraction-then-decentring
group. The overall design was a 2 (first in-
tervention; rumination v. distraction)‹2 (se-
cond intervention: decentring v. control) mixed
factors repeated measures (Time 1 v. Time 2 v.
Time 3) design. The groups were matched for
gender (eight women and four men in each
group).
Procedure
Participants gave written informed consent and
then completed the BDI and SCID. Participants
were told that the study was investigating
performance on reasoning tasks. All participants
completed one form of the AMT and self-report
measures of mood (Time 1) and then randomly
received either the rumination or distraction
conditions. Participants then completed the
AMT and self-report measures of mood again
(Time 2). Since the AMT was quite time-
consuming, a 2 min version of the distraction or
rumination task was repeated as a booster after
the second AMT, to reactivate that style of
processing prior to the decentring or control
tasks. Participants then randomly received either
the decentring or control prompt conditions,
before completing a third form of the AMT and
a third self-report of mood (Time 3). Participants
then rated the valence of the specific auto-
biographical memories they had recalled.
Participants completed a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire, asking about their experience of the
experiment. Finally, participants were debriefed,
thanked and paid.
RESULTS
The different types of memory response were
examined as a proportion of the number of
memories retrieved (i.e. excluding omissions).
All analyses were initially performed with sex of
participant as a between-subjects’ factor. There
were no significant main effects or interactions
with sex of participant; therefore, all analyses
reported were conducted by collapsing across
sex of participant. An alpha level of 0–05 was
used for all statistical tests. Table 2 shows the
means and standard deviations for the mood
measures and for the proportion of memories
recalled that were categorical and specific for all
four groups at all three times of measurement.
Fig. 1 displays the pattern of changes in recall of
categorical memories. There were too few
extended memories for meaningful statistical
analyses (less than 2–5% of the total of possible
memory responses).
Testing response styles : rumination v.
distraction
The two rumination groups were pooled and the
two distraction groups were pooled to form
respectively a rumination condition and a
distraction condition, which could be directly
compared. The pooling of the rumination and
distraction groups was possible because the
rumination and distraction manipulations oc-
curred before the decentring and control prompt
manipulation, so the decentring or control
prompts could not influence the response to
rumination or distraction.
Background variables
Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and
chi-squared analyses found no significant
difference between the rumination and distrac-
tion conditions for any measures or charac-
teristics.
Mood measures
To test the prediction that rumination would
increase or maintain depressed mood and dis-
traction would reduce depressed mood, 2 (First
intervention: rumination v. distraction)‹2
(Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures
ANOVAs were calculated. Nearly significant
First intervention‹Time interactions were
found for despondency, F(1, 46)fl 3–38, Pfl
0–072 and for happiness, F(1, 46)fl 3–46, Pfl
0–069. Although not significant at the 0–05 level,
these results were in a direction consistent with
previous findings in dysphoric undergraduates
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) that dis-
traction would reduce dysphoric mood while
rumination would maintain dysphoric mood.
There was a significant main effect of Time on
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for proportions of memories recalled
that were categorical and for mood ratings
Time}variable
Group
Rumination-
decentring
Mean (s.d.)
Rumination-
control
Mean (s.d.)
Distraction-
control
Mean (s.d.)
Distraction-
decentring
Mean (s.d.)
Time 1: baseline
Despondency 50–0 (23–6) 53–3 (23–8) 58–7 (19–8) 65–0 (17–4)
Happiness 35–4 (17–9) 45–0 (20–8) 32–9 (15–6) 32–9 (18–6)
Specific 0–71 (0–23) 0–72 (0–22) 0–72 (0–24) 0–59 (0–14)
Categorical 0–23 (0–21) 0–26 (0–23) 0–25 (0–25) 0–37 (0–17)
Time 2: post-first manipulation
Despondency 53–7 (23–4) 44–8 (27–9) 42–9 (21–4) 52–5 (23–1)
Happiness 39–2 (23–8) 44–2 (20–6) 44–6 (20–3) 44–2 (17–4)
Specific 0–69 (0–26) 0–71 (0–23) 0–80 (0–17) 0–75 (0–15)
Categorical 0–13 (0–26) 0–27 (0–23) 0–17 (0–16) 0–21 (0–14)
Time 3: post-second manipulation
Despondency 45–0 (19–5) 41–7 (25–6) 39–6 (21–9) 54–2 (29–1)
Happiness 45–4 (21–9) 47–1 (16–4) 43–7 (20–9) 44–6 (22–9)
Specific 0–81 (0–24) 0–70 (0–22) 0–81 (0–14) 0–84 (0–14)
Categorical 0–17 (0–23) 0–28 (0–21) 0–15 (0–13) 0–12 (0–13)
Despondency, is the self-report of despondency on a 0–100 Visual Analogue Scale. Happiness, is the self-report of despondency on a 0–100
Visual Analogue Scale. Specific, is the proportion of memories recalled that were specific. Categorical, is the proportion of memories recalled
that were categorical.
C
at
er
or
ic
al
 m
em
or
y 
(p
ro
po
rt
io
n)
0·4
0·35
0·3
0·25
0·2
0·15
0·1
baseline Time 2 Time 3
Fig. 1. The proportions of memories recalled that were categorical
at each point of measurement for all four experimental groups (^,
rumination then decentring; D, rumination then control ; _,
distraction then decentring; and E, distraction then control).
despondency, F(1, 46)fl 6–66, P! 0–015 and on
happiness, F(1, 46)fl 5–77, P! 0–03. Both
groups tended to improve mood from Time 1 to
Time 2.
Autobiographical Memory Test
To test the prediction that rumination would
increase overgeneral memory recall relative to
distraction, a repeated measures 2 (First in-
tervention: rumination v. distraction)‹2 (Time:
Time 1 v. Time 2) ANOVA examined the
proportions of memories recalled that were
categoric and specific." There was a significant
interaction of First intervention‹Time for the
proportion of categorical memories, F(1, 46)fl
11–36, P! 0–005 and for the proportion of
specific memories, F (1, 46)fl 8–7, P! 0–01. This
interaction reflected a decrease in the proportion
of categorical memories from Time 1 to Time 2
in the distraction group but not in the rumination
group (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). There were no
other significant main effects or interactions.
To check that the change in the overgenerality
of autobiographical memories was not the result
of change in mood state, the ANOVA was
repeated, with the change in despondency from
Time 1 to Time 2 as a covariate. The First
intervention‹Time interaction was still signifi-
cant for categorical memories, F(1, 45)fl 8–68,
P! 0–006 when mood was covaried out.
This finding is consistent with previous
suggestions that overgeneral memory is inde-
pendent of mood state (Williams & Dritschel,
1988; Brittlebank et al. 1993).
A repeated measures 2 (First intervention:
rumination v. distraction)‹2 (Time: Time 1 v.
Initial analyses of the proportion of memories recalled that were
categorical included the Valence of the cue words as a factor.
However, since there was no interaction of Valence with either the
First intervention of the Second intervention on the proportion of
categorical memories recalled, the reported analyses do not include
Valence as a factor.
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Time 2) ANOVA for the number of omissions
(times when no memory recalled) found no
significant main effects or interactions.
Testing the decentring effect
In order to test whether the effect of decentring
prompts v. control prompts on overgeneral
memory was dependent upon the preceding
manipulation, 2 (First intervention: rumination
v. distraction)‹2 (Second intervention:
decentring v. control) repeated measures
ANOVAs were calculated.
Background variables
Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and
chi-squared analyses found no significant
difference between the decentring and control
conditions for any measures or characteristics.
Mood measures
The 2 (First intervention: rumination v. dis-
traction)‹2 (Second intervention: decentring v.
control)‹2 (Time: Time 2 v. Time 3) repeated
measures ANOVAs were calculated for de-
spondency and happiness. There were no signifi-
cant main effects or interactions of either the
First or Second intervention, or of Time for
either despondency or happiness (see Table 2).
Autobiographical Memory Test
To examine whether the general nature of
autobiographical memory recall was influenced
by decentring, independently of prior manipu-
lations, a repeated measures 2 (First inter-
vention: rumination v. control)‹2 (Second
intervention: decentring v. control)‹2 (Time:
Time 2 v. Time 3) ANOVA was calculated for
the proportion of memories that were categorical
and specific. There was a significant main effect
of Time for categorical memories, F(1, 44)fl
10–62, P! 0–005 and for specific memories,
F(1, 44)fl 8–26, P! 0–01. However, this effect
was qualified by a significant interaction of the
Second intervention‹Time, for categorical
memories, F(1, 44)fl 9–48, P! 0–005 and for
specific memories, F(1, 44)fl 7–52, P! 0–01.
This interaction reflected a significantly greater
reduction in the proportion of categorical
memories recalled from Time 2 to Time 3 in the
decentring group than in the control group (see
Table 2). There were no significant interactions
of the First intervention‹Time and no
significant interactions of the First‹Second
interventions‹Time, (Fs ! 1 for all inter-
actions).
However, it was possible that the impact of
distraction and rumination on baseline scores
(i.e. the change from Time 1 to Time 2) might
differentially affect the responses to decentring
and control prompts (i.e. the change from Time
2 to Time 3). To control for this, the analysis
was repeated with the change in the proportion
of categorical memories from Time 1 to Time 2
as a covariate. There was still a significant
interaction of the Second intervention‹Time, F
(1, 43)fl 10–48, P! 0–003, reflecting a signifi-
cantly greater decrease in the proportion of
categorical memories for the decentring group
than the control group. There was a significant
main effect of Time, F(1, 43)fl 13–78, P! 0–002.
There were no other significant main effects or
interactions.
Examining Fig. 1, it seems that the significant
Second intervention‹Time interaction was
mainly carried by the difference between
decentring and control following rumination.
However, this does not reflect a First‹Second
interventions interaction, but rather reflects
distraction lowering the proportion of categ-
orical memories recalled to the floor level, such
that decentring and control conditions both
produced little change.
As a further check that the change in
categorical memory was not the result of a
change in mood, the repeated measures ANOVA
was repeated with the change in despondency
from Time 2 to Time 3 as a covariate. The
Second intervention‹Time interaction was still
significant, F(1, 43)fl 9–46, P! 0–005, as was
the main effect of Time, F(1, 43)fl 8–39,
P! 0–01, but no other main effects or inter-
actions were significant. Thus, the change in the
overgenerality of the autobiographical memories
was not secondary to changes in despondency.
A repeated measures 2 (First intervention:
rumination v. control)‹2 (Second intervention:
decentring v. control)‹2 (Time: 2 v. Time 3)
ANOVA was calculated for the number of
omissions. There was a significant Second
intervention‹Time interaction, F(1, 44)fl 5–69,
P! 0–03, reflecting a greater decrease in the
number of omissions in the decentring condition
(Time 2, meanfl 2–96, s.d.fl 2–25; Time 3, mean
fl 1–83, s.d.fl 1–34) than the control condition
(Time 2, meanfl 2–46, s.d.fl 2–36; Time 3, mean
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fl 2–87, s.d.fl 3–10). No other main effects or
interactions were significant.
Participants with current affective disorders
To test the generalizability of the changes in
categorical memories to a clinical sample, we
repeated the analyses on the subset of partici-
pants (Nfl 30) who met DSM-III-R diagnosis
for major depressive disorder alone (Nfl 22),
dysthymia alone (Nfl 4) or both major de-
pression and dysthymia (Nfl 4). This subsample
was evenly distributed across the different
conditions (rumination–decentring, Nfl 8;
rumination–control, Nfl 7; distraction–control,
Nfl 8; distraction–decentring, Nfl 7). The
First intervention (rumination v. distraction)
‹Time (Time 1 v. Time 2) interaction for
proportion of categorical memories recalled was
still significant in participants which clinical
diagnoses, F(1, 28)fl 4–45, P! 0–05. The Second
intervention (decentring v. control)‹Time
(Time 2 v. Time 3) interaction for proportion of
categorical memories recalled was still signifi-
cant, F(1, 26)fl 5–26, P! 0–05. There was a
nearly significant First intervention‹Second
intervention‹Time (Time 2 v. Time 3) inter-
action, F (1, 26)fl 4–08, Pfl 0–055. However,
this interaction was reduced, once the change in
proportion of categorical memories from Time 1
to Time 2 was used as a covariate, F (1, 25)fl
2–63, Pfl 0–12. This finding suggests that the
impact of distraction and rumination on baseline
scores (i.e. the change from Time 1 to Time 2)
differentially affected the responses to
decentring and control prompts (i.e. the change
from Time 2 to Time 3).
DISCUSSION
This study confirmed our prediction that, rela-
tive to rumination, distraction would reduce
overgeneral autobiographical memory. The
study also confirmed our prediction that
decentring questions would reduce overgeneral
memory relative to control questions. The results
suggested that the decentring effect did not
interact with the previous manipulation. These
findings suggest that overgeneral autobiographi-
cal memory can be influenced by manipulations
of the cognitive state of the person retrieving the
memory. However, the present results are still
consistent with the earlier suggestion that over-
general memory is independent of mood state.
The reductions in overgenerality of autobio-
graphical memory remained when despondency
was covaried out and occurred when there was
no significant effects of the inductions on
despondency, indicating that these changes
could not be accounted for by changes in mood.
However, the prediction that, relative to
rumination, distraction would significantly re-
duce dysphoric mood, was not confirmed,
although the effects on mood of rumination and
distraction were in a direction consistent with
the effects found by Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow
(1993). One difference between Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow (1993) and this study is
the sample population: they used mildly
dysphoric undergraduates, while this study used
volunteers closer to the clinical range of de-
pression. The limited effect of the rumination
condition in the current study might have
resulted from the participants spontaneously
ruminating at a ceiling level or already being at
ceiling for despondent mood.
Before considering the implications of the
current findings, it is worth noting several
limitations of the study. The current sample,
while dysphoric, was not a full clinical sample,
suggesting that replication with a sample of only
patients with major depressive disorder would
be useful. Furthermore, the experimental design
lacked non-dysphoric control groups, to exam-
ine whether the effects of the manipulations were
limited to a dysphoric sample. Since no other
studies have reported the repeated use of the
AMT in a single test session, it is possible that
repeated administrations of the AMT alone
would result in baseline changes in overgeneral
memory. Thus, repeated administrations of the
AMT using a control sample would be useful to
determine the effects of practice on baseline
changes in overgeneral memory for a non-
dysphoric group. Without knowing the baseline
changes in overgeneral memory to repeated
administrations of the AMT, it is not possible to
determine the manipulation active in altering
overgeneral memory. For example, if the trend
was for memories to become less categorical,
then rumination would be the active manipu-
lation; if the trend was for memories to become
more categorical or not alter, then distraction
would be the active manipulation.
Because of difficulties in recruiting partici-
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pants, symptoms were only assessed with a BDI
at one time point, instead of repeated adminis-
trations across time to check the stability of
mood. However, the high levels of past major
depressive disorder (75%) and current major
depression (50%), indicate that the experimental
sample was likely to have stable negative moods.
Furthermore, we wanted a sample with high
levels of categorical memory, for which a history
of past depression is a sufficient criterion.
Because of time limitations, only the Mood
Syndromes component of the SCID was
administered, preventing any conclusions about
the possible impact of co-morbid diagnoses on
the outcome of the manipulations.
The current results provide some new evidence
concerning the overgeneral autobiographical
memory phenomenon. First, the results confirm
that overgeneral autobiographical memory is
not immutable. The observation that changes in
the focus of cognitive processing prior to the
memory task can influence the recall of cat-
egorical memories, suggests that overgeneral
memory is influenced by the immediate cognitive
state at recall. This finding raises the possibility
that overgeneral autobiographical memory is
dynamically maintained; that increased gen-
eration of categorical memories depends upon
the continuing activation of a particular state or
mode of cognitive processing. Shifting pro-
cessing away from this state of processing, for
example by an experimental manipulation such
as distraction, may reduce the recall of cat-
egorical memories.
Secondly, the observed effects of distraction
and decentring must have occurred at the stage
of memory retrieval : encoding of the auto-
biographical memories occurred prior to the
experimental tasks. Therefore, the current
findings implicate memory retrieval processes,
rather than the encoding of memories, in the
generation of categorical memories. The ex-
perimental manipulations may have worked by
altering the accessibility of categorical memories.
Thirdly, the current results are consistent with
Williams’ (1996) hypothesis that rumination is
associated with the maintenance of overgeneral
memory. Rumination maintained categorical
autobiographical memory, while distraction
reduced categorical autobiographical memory.
A ruminative style is often found in individuals
at risk of depression (including people in
remission) and in people currently depressed
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and, therefore, may be
a factor in the high rates of overgeneral memory
found in these groups.
Fourthly, decentring questions reduced cat-
egorical memory recall compared to control
questions. Socratic questions in cognitive ther-
apy encourage people to recall different aspects
of personal experience, in order to challenge
negative thoughts and attributions. It seems that
the decentring prompts act in a similar way,
since they increased the recall of specific mem-
ories. Since the participants were not asked to
answer the questions during the task, the
increased recall of specific memories may be due
to either covert attempts to answer the questions
or to the questions implicitly priming the
accessibility of personal memories. We hypo-
thesize that because the decentring questions
were novel, without a ready-made answer, they
prompted participants to focus more directly on
their own experiences rather than on conceptual
knowledge. For example, the question ‘How
long does any mood last? ’ is unlikely to have
been encountered before and thus propositional
knowledge, summarizing past events, including
categorical memories, will not be helpful in
answering it. Rather, the question will encourage
focus on experiential knowledge, including
specific memories. We propose that this shift in
the focus of attention from propositional to
experiential knowledge increases the accessibility
of specific memories. This proposal is consistent
with the reduction in overgeneral memory found
for mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, which
also encourages people to focus in more detail
on their moment-to-moment experience
(Williams et al. 2000). Future experiments,
manipulating the degree to which questions
encourage experiential versus conceptual focus,
could test this hypothesis.
The reduction in overgeneral memory fol-
lowing the distraction task and the decentring
task suggests specific clinical strategies for
depression. Since challenging negative thoughts
and problem solving depend upon the ability to
access specific information (Williams, 1992), the
prior use of distraction or decentring tasks may
aid these endeavours. However, the relative
efficiency and ease of use of the two strategies in
a clinical setting remain to be determined.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that
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the tendency to retrieve overgeneral autobio-
graphical memories can be altered by brief
experimental manipulations of cognitive pro-
cessing. These results suggest that overgeneral
memory depends upon the style of processing
active at memory retrieval. This finding suggests
that suitable psychological treatments could
reduce overgeneral memory in depressed
patients, consistent with Williams et al. (2000).
The current result extend the empirical data
indicating the impact of distraction v. rumination
on the valence of autobiographical memories
retrieved (Lyubormirsky et al. 1998) to the
specificity of memories retrieved, implicating
rumination as a possible factor in overgeneral
memory. Future research will need to determine
to what extent similar or different processes are
involved in the mechanisms of decentring and
distraction. The role of rumination in the
generation of overgeneralmemories also requires
further testing.
This article is based on research carried out by the
first author in partial fulfilment for the degree of
Ph.D at the University of London. This Ph.D was
supported by a Medical Research Council (United
Kingdom) Studentship grant. We gratefully acknowl-
edge the help of Professors Susan Nolen-Hoeksema
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materials.
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